Price is high, but we should stay in Afghanistan

FOR the past seven years the United Kingdom and the international community have been fighting in Afghanistan to restore some semblance of peace and security to a country that has seen nothing but violence since 1979.

Two days ago Britain lost three more of her finest to a suicide bomb near Sangin. These latest fatalities bring the total British dead to 100. They will not be the last to die in Afghanistan.

It is at times like these that policy-makers and the public alike question the rationale and objectives of being involved in a conflict that seems to have no end in sight.

On the surface, it is easy to dismiss the operations in Afghanistan as unnecessary and the criticisms are frequent. This is America's war. We can't win. They've defeated us before. We are playing colonial games. Afghanistan is far from the UK, it does not matter what happens there.

But the criticisms are also wrong. In today's world one cannot separate the security of Afghanistan from the security of the UK. It is also foolhardy to think that somehow Afghanistan is just Washington's problem.

For the better part of two decades the West ignored the violence and endemic poverty that plagued Afghanistan. We did so at our own peril.

Studies have been able to illustrate an inverse relationship between per-capita income and the length of a civil war – the poorer the country, the longer the war. It should be no surprise that Afghanistan ended up as a safe haven for Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network.

Given the connection between development and security, the goal in Afghanistan is twofold.

First, Nato is fighting a counter-insurgency against those wanting to ignore the will of the Afghan people, who have voted for a democratic system.

Second, the United Nations, European Union and other organisations are trying to build on the windows of security opened by Nato to provide Afghanistan with economic development and social reconciliation.

This process will take a very long time and it will be incredibly difficult. Success is not assured. However, one thing is for certain – we owe it to the Afghans and ourselves to try to create a better future for Afghanistan and the region.

The UK is not trying to colonise Afghanistan, or to install a client state, as the Soviets tried to do in the 1980s. Afghans recognise this and have so far stood by Nato operations despite civilian casualties and continuing insecurity. They understand that building a better future will take time, but they are becoming increasingly concerned about the pace of operations and western commitment to continued action. The record of progress in Afghanistan is unquestionable. More than 4,000km of roads have been built since 2001. An impressive figure, given the virtual absence of roads in the country before.

More than 2,000 schools have been built or repaired, catering for some 6.4 million children. This figure includes 1.5 million girls that in Taleban Afghanistan had no education and no future.

There has been a 26 per cent fall in infant mortality over the past five years and 80 per cent of the population now has access to health care, compared with 8 per cent under the Taleban.

This record of achievement, however, is marred by equally undeniable statistics on continuing insecurity. According to Nato, there were 2,515 "security incidents" in Helmand province alone in 2007.

The south and east of the country remain racked by a violent insurgency fuelled by non-Afghan actors. Nato classes only about 60 per cent of the country as "relatively stable".

In 2007, the UN development programme ranked Afghanistan 174 out of 178 countries on its global development index. Only 28 per cent of the population is literate, unemployment hovers at about 40 per cent and 53 per cent of the population lives in poverty. Per-capita GDP is about £500.

But the lack of progress in these areas cannot be justified simply by saying Afghanistan is a hard case. Poor co-ordination and civilian capability within the international community have also greatly hampered efforts.

The UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan has always been too small to effect real change. The UN went in with a small footprint, like Nato, but failed to adapt to a situation that soon revealed itself to be much more demanding than originally envisioned.

The EU and Nato are also plagued by poor co-operation because of domestic European politics regarding how the two organisations should co-operate.

Additionally, more than £5 billion of non-military assistance pledged to Afghanistan over the past six years has not been delivered. Too much of our non-military assistance ends up back in the coffers of western companies and analysts contracted to provide development services, instead of in the pockets of Afghans.

Seven years on, the task at hand is to transfer an increasingly large share of responsibility for security to the Afghan National Army. This process is already under way and will last several years. Western forces will be needed for some time, however, to shore up the still-fledging Afghan forces.

Even more important will be continued foreign aid and development programmes to ensure a young democracy and a nascent Afghan civil society will be strong enough to rebuff the Taleban and foreign insurgents that want to continue to manipulate Afghanistan for their own nefarious ends.

Next week Afghan and world leaders will meet in Paris to determine how best to keep Afghanistan on the road to progress.

The road is long, but it is one the Afghans are willing to walk. We should continue to walk it with them.

• Dr Michael Williams is head of the Transatlantic Security Programme of the Royal United Services Institute.

Roadside lottery of bomb attacks

FOR the British soldiers on the ground across Afghanistan, life has become a lottery of roadside bombs and suicide attacks. Gone are the days of pitched battles when Taleban fighters would attack en masse and fight for ground. Back then a soldier could fire and manoeuvre to survive. Now they take their chances against an enemy they rarely see.

The insurgents have learned a bloody lesson since the Parachute Regiment first arrived. They can't beat an army that is better trained, better equipped and backed by fast jets and helicopter gunships. So they have turned to homemade bombs, sometimes strapped to fanatics' chests, more often simply buried in the desert to await an unknown prey.

On a routine foot patrol in Musa Qala last week, the fear of a suicide attack was palpable. The troops, from the 1 Royal Irish Regiment, would scream at cars and children not to come near them, their hands and rifles raised to warn drivers off. They chatted to some locals, but only after they'd been frisked more than 50 metres away at a police checkpoint, and they avoided walking down the main bazaar as there were too many people to maintain a stand-off. "It would be too easy for a suicide bomber to get us," said Colour Sergeant John Brennan.

For the soldiers fighting in Afghanistan, the milestone of 100 deaths doesn't matter. "One was too many," said a corporal in Camp Bastion. "Ninety-nine was too many; they are never just a number."

But life goes on for the fighting soldiers left behind. Most patrols are designed to reassure farmers that British and Afghan forces are bringing security. But it doesn't always make them welcome. The farmers know that where the soldiers go, the bombs will follow.

In the past ten weeks, Britain's bomb-disposal team has dealt with 80 improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, compared with just 57 in the six months in the previous tour.

Even if security improves, as it has in pockets of the province, and the Taleban lose the men, the munitions or the will to fight head-on, the soldiers in Helmand know the bombs' lottery is likely go on for many years.